IIANS ROTT logical theorems {A: A E Cn(QI)} ' d IS enoted by LT. M E L is called consistent if L 4 Cn(M)
. We frequently write M k A for A E Cn(M). Throughout this paper, variables A, B, C etc. range over arbitrary sentences, and variables M, N, M', N', M" etc. range over arbitrary sets of sentences.
How can such a holistic theory of belief revision handle inconsistent theories? I believe that Twcety can fly. What should I do if I come to know that Twcety in fact does not fly? As a first answer, I may be content with the advice that I first have to withdraw my belief that Tweety can fly, then add the belief that Twccty cannot and finally take the deductive closure. (This advice has become known as the hvi idenfiry.) A moment's reflection shows that the real problems are not solved by this move. How are contractions to be accomplished? Peter Glrdenfors founded and developed, partly in collaboration with David Makinson and Carlos Alchourron, the approach I am going to sketch now. At the end of the 1970s he started by specifying a set of "rationality postulates" or constraints that must be satisfied by operations on a knowledge set in order to model the intuitive process of knowledge contraction. Let K be a knowledge set and :K bc a function from L to 2'-. We write K L A for Lo.
Then :K is a contrac- For the motivation of these constraints for contractions see [4] , Chapter 3, [5] , and 171. (Cl)-(C8) make sure, among other things, that contractions do not incur unnecessary loss of information.' As we will almost exclusively be concerned with the formal aspects of the dynamics of knowledge systems in the following, some familiarity with the literature cited is useful for the reader. Even if we dispose of a reasonable set of postulates for contractions, this will not help us in actually performing any contraction or revision of our current knowledge system. What we need is a method of constrz~rinl: a new state of knowledge out of the earlier enc. We require some structure here to guide us which in a way corresponds to the information contained in the distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs in nonmonotonic reasoning. or in the storage of the justifications for our beliefs in reason maintenance systems. In this paper I shall briefly review two different methods of knowledge contraction that were suggested in the course of the Gardenforsian research program. Then a tight connection between these methods will be established showing that they even can be viewed as cquivalent. I close with some remarks on simple and iterated revisions.
TWO ORDERINGS FOR CONTRACTION CONSTRUCTJOTS
The first method I want to discuss is investigated in Alchourron, Glrdenfors and Makinson [2] and may be called the method of I&I-tionalparrial meet contractions.
When trying to exclude A from K while minimizing the loss of information, it is tempting to take a maximal subset of K that does not imply A. Let M(K, A) be the set of all such subsets. AIchourron and - Makinson [l] showed, howcvcr. that the choice of an element of M(K. A) will in gcncral leave far too many sentences untouched. Conversely. they proved that the full meet fl M(K, A) cancels far too many sentences from K. A natural idea is to consider the pmtiuf meet of some prejkred clcmcnts of M(K, A). Provided that we have a preference relation on M(K), where M(K) = U {M(K, A): I! A],' we can obtain reasonable contractions:
If L is a contraction function over K and there is a (transitive) preference relation < on M(K) such that -= C( <), then I is called a (transitively) relational partial meet contraction function ((T) RPMCF).
Note that M(K, A) = @ if and only if A E LT. Now, what properties should we require for 6'~ Alchourrbn, Gardenfors and Makinson [2] make use of only two postulates:
Only relations < satisfying (PO) are intended to quality as pwference relations (P-relations).3 The authors show that C( &) satisfies (Cl)-(C8) if < satisfies (PO) and (PI). Conversely, they prove a representation theorem: Any contraction function -over K satisfying (Cl)-(C8) is a TRPMCF. In the proof, a preference relation < = P* ( 2) is constructed from a given contraction function -over K, and it is shown that C(P*( -)) = A. We put off the discussion of P*( -) until the end of Section 4. A second method of constructing contractions, the method of epistemic entrenchment contractions, is found for the first time in Gardenfors [4] , Section 4.8, and presented more elegantly in Glrdenfors and Makinson [5] . Some relation over the sentences in a knowledge set is supposed to exist that reflects how deeply entrenched these sentences are in our current state of knowledge. Provided that we have a relation of epistemic entrenchment on L, then, Gardenfors and Makinson recommend that it should guide us in performing knowledge contractions as follows: DEFINITION 2. If I is a relation of epistemic entrenchment on L then the associated contraction function -= C(I) over K is given
If -is a contraction function over K and there is a relation of epistemic entrenchment I on L such that -= C(I), then L is called an epistemic entrenchment contraction function (EECF).
There should be no danger of confusion of this 'C' with the 'C' of Definition 1 if the difTerent arguments arc carefully kept apart. A < A v BofcoursestandsforA I A v BandnotA v B I A. We ought to say what features make a relation on L count as a relation of epistemic entrenchment (EE-relation). In [5] we find the following collection of postulates: Note that (E2), following from (El), (E3) and (E4), is redundant. Nevertheless it is expedient to have it as a principle of its own. For example, (E2) immediately entails that I is reflexive. Since K appears in (E5), we call I an EE-relation with respect to K. For the intuitive motivation of these postulates, see [3] , [4] , [q. The content of Definition 2 is not easy to grasp. But it receives an excellent justification from its interplay with the (re-)construction of EE-orderings out of the contraction behaviour. To sum up, we find ourselves faced with Scheme 1.
In my view, it is more natural to have a relation I on L than a relation < on 2L. On the other hand, the rationale behind (T)RPMCFs is easier to understand than that behind EECFs. So both kinds of contraction constructions have their intuitive merits. It seems very desirable to know something about the relationship between (T)RPMCFs and EECFs. This is what we shall be concerned with in the main part of this paper. 3 . CONNECTING TIIE TWO ORDERIh-GS:
GARDENFORS' I:IRST ATTEMPT
The first attempt to connect P-relations and EE-relations is due to Ggrdenfors [3] . In this paper. however, Gtirdcnfors uses a different set of postulates for epistemic entrenchment. It does not include the limiting case conditions (E5) and (E6), and instead of (E4) it includes an apparent dual, viz.,
There is also another postulate for the preference relation < (which has already been discussed in [2] ):
Glrdenfors [3] , pp. 359-360. then builds a two-way bridge between I and d . For any given P-relation ,<, an EE-relation I = E( <) is associated with < by defining A I B if and only if for all M in M(K) such that A E M there is an !M in M(K) such that B E IV' and M < M'. Conversely, for any given EE-relation 5, a P-relation d = P( 5) is associated with I by defining A4 < M' if and only if there is an A E A4 such that for all B E M' it holds that A I B.
Notice that these definitions look at the sentences that are retained in some elements of M(K). Notice also that the second definition attaches most importance to the epistcmically least entrenched sentences in A4 and M', a fact which might raise some intuitive suspicion.
The formal results of Glrdenfors [3] are impressive. He shows that if < satisfies (PI) and (PZ), then E(G) satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*). If I satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*), then P(I) satisfies (PI)-(P2), provided that K is a,finite knowledge set, in the sense that Cn partitions it into finitely many equivalence classes.4 In the finite case, Ggrdenfors shows that P(E($)) and Q are identical relations on M(K), provided that < satisfies (Pl) and (P2), and that E(P(<)) and I are identical relations on K, provided that I satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*). q Lemma 1 indeed shows that (E4*) is fatal. There are good reasons to represent all beliefs concerning particular matters of fact by ordinary sentences (compare (E6) above). There are also good reasons to keep extraordinary sentences in contractions as long as possible. But combining this and Lemma 1 entails that giving up any of our factual beliefs must result in giving up all of our factual beliefs, which is absurd. It seems to me, then, that we have to reject (E4*). Yet we do not have to renounce results of the Gardenfors [3] style. In the next section, I shall suggest different connections between E-relations and P-relations and then mimic Gardenfors' theorems (where the finiteness assumption is dispensed with in all but one case). Furthermore, I show that EECFs and TRPMCFs are equivalent if the new bridge is crossed in either of the two possible ways.
THE REAL CONNECTION
We begin by extending < to an ordering of arbitrary sets of sentences, i.e.. to a relation on 2L. Henceforth we will call d a preference relation, or P-relution, with respect to a knowledge set K if and only if Q satisfies the following collection of postulates:
As in the case of EE-relations, connectivity is redundant, but we shall keep it as a postulate of its own in order to see its power. In contrast to EE-relations (see (E3)): P-relations seem to allow some kind of informational-content reading if we look only at (P3). However, (P4) shows that one must be cautious with interpretations. I do not want to discuss the intuitive content of (PO)-(P6) here. In any case, these postulates will turn out to be suitable, when we follow a new road from < to I and vice versa. Notice that these definitions put special attention to the sentences that are missing in some set of sentences, and that Definition 5 attaches most importance to the epistemically must entrenched sentences missing. I believe that these features are intuitively more appealing than those of the Gardenforsian definitions mentioned in Section 3. Definitions 4 and 5 are formulated in close analogy to the Girdenfors definitions. We arc now going to state some useful equivalent formulations in two technical lemmas. LEMMA 2. Let < he a P-relation on 2'. with respect to a knowledge set of K. Then the fallowing three conditions are equivakent:
(ii) far all knowledge sets M such that B 4 M there is u knowledge set N such that A 4 N and M < N; (iii) for all M E 2L such that M If B there is an N E 2L such that N # A and M < N. Proof. From (i) to (ii): Let M be a knowledge such that B # M. By (P4), (P6) and (PI), we get M Q M n K. Since M A K is again a knowledge set and B 4 M n K, there is an M' in M(K, B) such that M n K s M', the latter giving us M n K < M', by (P3). By application of(i) WC get that there is an M" in M(K) such that A $ M" and M d M". Since elements of M(K) are knowledge sets and since A4 Q M n K < M' < M", we find that, by (PI). M" is an N we are looking for in (ii).
From (ii) to (iii): Let M E 2L be such that M V B. Let M' = Cn(M) is a knowledge set, B F$ M' and, by (P3). M d M'. By application of (ii) WC get that there is a knowledge set N such that A 4 N and M' < N. Since knowledge sets are closed under Cn, N Y A: and we find that, by (Pl) . N is just such an N as we arc looking for in (iii).
From (iii) to (i): Let M in M(K) bc such that B $ M. Since elements of M(K) arc knowledge sets, M V B. By application of (iii) we get that there is an N E 2L such that N tf A and M < N. Set N' = Cn(N); then A $ N' and, by (P3), .N < N'. By (P4), (P6) and (Pl), we get N' Q IV' n K. Since N' n K is a knowledge set and
and (Pl). we find that M' is just such as M' as we are looking for in (i) . cl
It will be convenient to have an additional technical concept in the following. If I is an EE-relation on L, then an EE-cut, or simply cul, is a set of sentences S such that for any A in S all sentences B with A I B are also in S.' We note some properties of cuts. It is easy to verify that the class of all cuts is closed under arbitrary unions and intersections, that cuts arc nested (by (E2)), and that S.,, defined by {B: A < B}, and S;, , defined as {B: A I B}. are cuts by (El)). The largest cut is L = {R: I I B], then comes K = (B: I < B) (if K # L), then come subsets of K, the smallest but one cut is LT = {B: T I B) and the smallest cut is @ = (B: T < B) (by (Ej), (E3) and (E6)). Any non-empty cut S is a knowledge set, provided that Cn is compact. iz}, hence, by (El), Bi I A. But as Bi E S and S is a cut, this entails that A E S, and we arc done.
We are now able to recast the defining condition of Definition 5. Notice that the proof of Lemma 3 makes use only of the transitivity and connectivity of I. In the following we shall frequently work with the nicer conditions (iii) of Lemma 2 and (ii) of Lemma 3 in lieu of the characterizations of E( <) and P(I) given in Definitions 4 and 5. We are now going to explore the interrelation between EErelations and P-relations. LEMMA 5. Let I be an EE-relation on L (with respect to u knowiedge set K). Then < = P(I) sutisfies (PO)-(P6). Proof. For (PO), assume that :M(K, A) # 0. Then t: A. We have to show that there is an M E M(K, A) such that for all M' E M(K, A), M' < M, the latter meaning that every cut S G M' is a subset of M. We first note that the largest cut that can be a subset of any element of M(K, A) is S, = {S: A < B}, since every larger cut includes A (by the reflexivity of 5). Second, .y, # 0. by (E5). A third observation is that the non-empty cut S', is a knowledge set which does not contain A. hence S,, h! A. But now we see that M(K, A) must contain a superset M of S,,. Clearly for any M' E M(K, A) and any cut S, if S c M' then S 5 S, E M, and we are done. -(Pl) is immediate, and (P2) follows from (PI), (P3) and (P4). -For (P3), assume that M 5 N. For M < IV, we have to verify that every cut S c M is a subset of X, which is trivial. -For (P4). suppose for reductio ud ubsurdum M $ M A N and 1'~' $ M n N. This means that there is a cut S such that S G M and S $ M n N and a cut S' such that S' c N and S' $Z M n N. From S c M and S' G IV we get S n S' c_ M r\ N. But since cuts arc nested, S n S' = S or S n S' = S', and we get a contradiction. -For (P5), assume that CM d N for all N. This means that for any N E 2'. and any cut S, if S E M then S c IV, or equivalently, that for any cut S, if S E $1 then S = 0. Since LT is the second smallest cut (which is due to (E6)). the latter is equivalent to A C$ M for some A such that t A. -For (P6), let K # L. Assume that 11' d M for cvcry consistent N. This means that for every consistent N and every cut S, if S c IV then S c M, or equivalently, since K # L is the second largest cut (which is due to (ES)), K G $2.
cl Note that the proof of Lemma 5 requires all of the postulates (El)-(E6), which already enter into our knowledge of cuts. THEOREM 1. Let <_ be an EE-relation on L (with respect to a knowledge set K). Then I * = E(P( I)) is identical with 1.
Proof. We have to show that A <* 3 if and only if A I B. From left to right: Let A I* B, which means that for all M such that M Y B there is an N such that N tt A and for all cuts S, if S c M then S G N. Suppose for reductio that B < A, i.e., that A E S,. Since S, is a knowledge set not containing B, S, V B. Thus there must be an N such that N ti A and S, s N. But since A E S,, N contains A, so N t A, and we have a contradiction.
From right to left: Let B <* A, which means that there is an M such that M P 1y and for all N such that N If A there is a cut S such that S G M and S $ N. Suppose for reductio that A i B, i.e., that A $ S,. Since S, is a knowledge set, S, Y A. Thus there must be an M such that M V B and a cut S such that S c M and S 9 S,. From the latter condition it follows that there is a C in S such that C I tl, and since S is a cut, B must be in S too. But as S G M, then B E M, so M t B, and we have a contradiction. Cl THEOREM 2. Let 6 be a P-relation on 2' with respect to afinite knowledge set K. Then the restrictions of <* = P(E( <)) and < to the cluss of'knowledge sets are identical. ProoJ Let K be a finite knowledge set. We have to show that for any two knowledge sets M and N, M <* N iff M < N. Let N and M always stand for knowledge sets in this proof. The cut notation is not useful here, so we apply the original condition of Definition 5.
From left to right: Let M <* N, which means that for all A 4 N there is a B 4 M such that for all M' with M' If B there is an N' such that N' !I A and M' < N'. As M is a knowledge set, we can put M' = M, getting that for all A 4 N there is an N' such that N' If A and M < N'. In particular, for all A E K -N there is an N' such that N' I/ A and M d N'. Since K is finite module Cn, we will need only finitely many such sets N'. Call them N,', . . . , N,,'. Since N' V A entails A 4 N', we have (N,' n . . . n NJ n K s N n K, hence (N,' n . . . n N,,') n K < N n K. On the other hand, by (n-I)-fold application of (P4), &' d IV; n . . . n A{; for some i E { 1, . _ . . n>. Furthermore, (P4), (P6) and (PI) give us N; n . . . n Xi d (IV,' n . . . n NJ n K. Putting all this together, we finally get the chain M < Ni' < ;-l)y,, ,ryi;ya;Ir; iT. . . n N,,') n K B N n K Q N, and. by From right to left: Let N <* M, which means that there is an A # N such that for all B I$ M there is an IM' with JM' Y B such that for all N' with :V' H A, N' < 1M'. As N is a knowledge set, we can put N' = IV, getting that for all B 6 A4 there is an M' such that M' V B and N < M'. By a chain of reasoning entirely analogous to the from-left-to-right case, we get N < 1M. 0
The last four results reproduce those of Gardenfors [3] in our new setting. The main differences are these: first, I USC more complete sets of conditions for < and 6; second, I consider I as a relation not only on K but on I. and < as a relation not only on M(K) but on 2'-; third, I need the finiteness assumption for K only once where Gardenfors uses it three times. The most interesting observations of this paper are, 1 believe, the following theorems for which there are no precedents in [3] . Roughly, they say that partial meet contractions based on d and cpistemic entrenchment contractions based on < are equivalent, if Q and I are related by either Definition 4 or Defnition 5. THEOREM 3. Let < he a P-relution on 2'. (with respect to a knowledge set K). Then C(E( <)) is identical with C( <). Pruqf. If we write --_ for C(E( <)) and -* for C( <). we have to show that K -A = K A-* A for any A E L. This is trivial in the limiting case of A E LT where by delinition K 1 A = K = K --L* A. Now let A 4 LT.
Condition ( THEOREM 4. Let I be an EE-relation on L (with respect to knowledge set K). Then C(P( -<)) is identical with C(I). Proof. From Lemma 5 we know that P(I) is a P-relation with respect to K. Hence, by Theorem 3, C(P( I)) = C(E(P( I))). Theorem I te!ls us that E(P(<)) = <, hence C(E(P(<))) = C ( 2) . Putting this together, we get C(P( I)) = C(I). 0
Taking over the connection between EE-relations and (EE-)contraction functions from 151: we are now presented Scheme 2.
The missing links between preference relations and contraction functions are supplied easily by a last connecting definition. DEFINITION 6. If A is a contraction function over K then the associated preference relation d = P(l) on 2L is given by P(E(-)).
P( -) of course satisfies (PO)-(P6). We can establish a number of corrollaries in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 4.
COROLLARIES.
Let 2 he a contraction function over a knowledge set K, I an EE-relation and < he a P-relation with respect to K. Then the following identities hold:
(ii) P(C( <)) = < within the class of knowledge sets. provided that K is finite.
(iii) P(C(I)) = P(S).
(4 E(C(<)) = E(d).
(4 E(P(2)) = E(L).
A last interesting question is how Definition 6 relates to the construction of a preference relation P*( 1) which can be found in Alchourron, Girdenfors and Makinson [2] , p. Since both C(P*( A)) = -I (see [2] ) and C(P(2)) = A (corollary (i) above), one may expect that P* (l) and P(A) show some agreement. Obviously it is only interesting to compare the restrictions of P*(L) and P(A) to M(K). I could not prove: nor do I think it is true that in general P*( -) and P(-) are identical within the whole range of M(K). However, we can get the following result: THEOREM 5. Let 2 he a contraction function over a knolc+edge set K. If < = P(z) and 6* = P*(A), then A4 6 M' if3^M 6* M',for ali M in X(K) -{K) and M' in N(K). At the end of Section 2 we noted that it is easier to conceive EErelations on L then P-relations on 2L, but that EE-contraction functions are not very perspicuous. In many contexts, however, one is interested in contraction functions only as a means of obtaining revisions. We base the following considerations on the advice of the Levi identity which tells us that a revision function + = R(A) over a knowledge set K is to be constructed from a contraction functionover K by putting K -& A = Cn((K 2 1 A) u {A}) for all sentences A. In the case of an EE-contraction function 1, then, it is possible to specify a very simple "withdrawal function" \ over K (the term is due to Makinson [S] ) which is revision-equivalent over K in the sense that R(\) = R(L). We make use of EE-cuts which have been helpful in simplifying some proofs of the last section. It is easy to see that 'I~, has nearly all the properties of a contraction function:
LEMMA 6. Let 5 be an EE-relation on L (with respect to a knowledge set K). Then 't,, = W(I) satisfies (Cl)- (C4) and (C6)-(Cl?). but not ( (3). Proof: For FA we have K(,A = K, and it is easy to verify (Cl)-(C8). So let VA. Then, by (E6) and (E2), S,, # a. We saw in Section 4 that non-empty cuts are knowledge sets, so (Cl) is satisfied. (C2) and (C3) We give a counterexample to (C5). Let A, B E L such that tiA and A V B. WC consider K = Cn({A: B}) and define 5 on L by putting T 5 C 5 T for C E LT, I I C I I for C 4 K. I < C < T for C E K -LT, C I D and D I C for C, D E K -LT, and then taking the transitive closure. It is easy to check that this generates an EE-relation on L. We find that Cn((K\, A) u (A}) = Cn({ C: A < C 1 u {A)) = Cn(LT u {A)) = Cn((A]). Since by assumption K = Cn({A, B)) and A tf B, then, K is not a subset of Cn((K!,, A) u [A)).
Given ';, = W(I) and -= C(I) for some EE-relation I on L, it is clear that K\ A E K 2 A: if A < B then B E K by (E5) and A < A v B by (E3) and (El). But K\ A gives up too many sentences (see the counterexample to (C5) just given). The violation of the recovery postulate (C5) is a violation of the idea of minimal loss of information (see [8] for a thorough discussion of recovery). It is interesting to observe, however, that \ is revision-equivalent to -: LEMMA 7. Let I he an EE-relation on L. Then R( W( -<)) = R(C( g 1).
Proof. We have to show that Cn(.S,, u (1 A)) = Cn((K n {B: A < A v B)) u (1 A}). We already know that S, 5 K A (B: A < A v B}), so it remains to show that RHS c LHS. Suppose that C E RHS, i.e., that there arc B,, . . . , B,, such that Bi E K and A <A v B,foralli= I,..., nandB ,,..., B,,,iAtC(iA may be redundant). Then obviously A v B,, . . . , A v B,, A v 1 A 1 A v C. Since we may drop the premise A v 1 A and since A v B,ESAforalli= I,..., n, WC find that A v C E Cn(S,), so C E Cn (S, u {i A}) . 0
The upshot of Lemma 7 is that it is very easy to perform EE-revisions, i.e., revisions obtained from IX-contractions via the Levi identity. In order to go to K $ A, jwst keep all those sentences of K that are epistemically better entrenched than 1 A, add A and take the deductive closure. There is no trouble with intricate comparisons of disjunctions as in Definition 2. This appears to be a very perspicuous and managable method of constructing revisions of knowledge bases.
REMARKS ON ITERATED REVISIONS
So far WC have investigated transitions from some knowledge set K to a revised knowledge set K + A. On closer inspection, however, it comes out that we started out from K together with an EE-relation < with respect to K but ended up with a bare set of sentences. There is no guidance at all what to do if we were to revise K 4 A in a second step. WC need an IX-relation <A with respect to K + A to accomplish iterated revisions. To put it differently. it is not knowledge sets that have to be revised but EE-relations." We can indeed get something like revisions of EE-relations in the Gardenfors model, but they are not perfect. I believe the most suitable suggestion is this: (ii) Let s,~ and K + A satisfy (E5). That is,
("1 C cA B for some C if and only if t3 E K j-A.
By Definition 8, the LHS of (*) means that A + C < A + B for some C which, by (E3), is equivalent to 1 A < A + B, or A ---f B E S..,,4. We recall from Section 4 that the asumption VT A implies that S,,j # 0 is a theory. So A -+ B E S,, is equivalent to B E Cn(-L u {Al). Comparing this with the RHS of (*), we can transform the postulate (ES) for I,,, and K + A into K + A = Cn (S.,, u (A}) . By Lemma 7, this means that K + A = K +* A where -j-* = R(C(<)), and WC are done.
(iii) By (E3), A 4 B I A -+ A for all B, hence B srl A for all B, despite the assumption that VA. So I, , violates (E6) . cl
The only point that does not fit into the nice picture is mentioned in part (iii). On the one hand, I do not think that the violation of maximality is very annoying. On the other hand, the way how Definition 8 invalidates maximality is dissatisfying. Evidently, A is a greatest element under I", by t A --, A and (E3). So A is put on the same level as the theorems of the logic Cn in K j-A. Worse, A cannot lose this extraordinary status through later revisions, which is again due to Definition 8. For instance, we cannot make plausible statements about (K + A) + 1 A. Because A is extraordinary in K + A, the EE-revision (K -j-A) + in is Cn((B: A cA B) u (iA}) = Cn(iA), while intuitively we rather expect (K + A) -/-1 A = K j-1 A if tfi A. Difficulties like this arc, I believe, not to be ascribed in some awkwardness of Definition 8, but to the fundamental limitations of the purely relational EErevision model. Corresponding difficulties are known in probability theory, where standard conditionalization gives PA(A) = 1, and no later conditionalization of P,, will push the probability of A down any more. A well-known solution of this problem is to employ the Jeffrey conditionalization PA,o: = aPA + (I -a)P,, for some certainty factor a between 0 and 1. It seems that in order to tackle the analogous problem for non-probabilistic revisions the purely relational structure of knowledge bases must be enriched to an ordinal one. This task is accomplished by Spohn's [9, lo] 
